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SECTION 129 AND THE COURTS:
STILL IN SEARCH OF A STANDARD
The recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in the case of Commissioner v. British Motor Car Dis-
tributors, Ltd.,' has rekindled interest in section 129 (a) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939, now section 269 (a) of the 1954 Code,
which deals with acquisitions of loss corporations. 2 Since the Tax
Court has indicated that it will follow this case,3 the decision appears
to have given new life to the section and could have a far-reaching
effect on the conduct of American businessmen.
In this case, the Empire Home Equipment Co., a corporation en-
gaged in the business of selling home appliances, sustained heavy
operating losses over a three year period, and proceeded to liquidate
its assets until nothing was left but the corporate shell.' It reported
its assets on its 1951 income tax return as "Nil."'s A partnership, the
British Motor Car Co., engaged in selling foreign-made automobiles,
offered to buy the outstanding stock of Empire for $21,250, provided
the corporation would change its name and increase its authorized
capital.' Empire accepted the offer and the transaction took place as
outlined. The partnership then transferred all of its assets to the
1. 278 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1960), reversing 31 T.C. 437 (1958).
2. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 129 (a), 58 Stat. 47 (now Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 269(a)).
Disallowance of Deduction, Credit, or Allowance.-If (1) any person or
persons acquire, on or after October 8, 1940, directly or indirectly, con-
trol of a corporation, or (2) any corporation acquires, on or after Octo-
ber 8, 1940, directly or indirectly, property of another corporation, not
controlled, directly or indirectly, immediately prior to such acquisition, by
such acquiring corporation or its stockholders, the basis of which prop-
erty, in the hands of the acquiring corporation, is determined by refer-
ence to the basis in the hands of the transferor corporation, and the
principal purpose for which such acquisition was made is evasion or
avoidance of Federal income or excess profits tax by securing the benefit
of a deduction, credit, or other allowance which such person or corporation
would not otherwise enjoy, then such deduction, credit, or other allowance
shall not be allowed. For the purposes of clause (1) and (2), control
means the ownership of stock possessing at least 50 per centum of the
total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or at
least 50 per centum of the total value of shares of all classes of stock of
the corporation.
3. Thomas E. Snyder Sons Co., 34 T.C. No. 39 (June 6, 1960).
4. Commissioner v. British Motor Car Distributors, Ltd., 278 F.2d 392, 393
(1960).
5. Id. at 393.
6. Ibid.
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revitalized corporation for additional shares of stock. The corpora-
tion, now the British Motor Car Distributors, Ltd., operated profitably
for the fiscal years 1952 and 1953 and attempted to deduct net opera-
ting losses of the old Empire firm, under the net operating loss carry-
over provisions.7 This was disallowed by the Commissioner, but the
Tax Court, on redetermination, permitted the deductions,$ following
its decisions in the T.V.D. Co.9 and Alprosa Watch Corp.10 cases, to the
effect that section 129 applied only to acquiring corporations.1 The
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 129(a) (1) forbade
exactly the type of conduct evident here.12
In order to appreciate the importance of this decision, it is necessary
to examine the entire theory supporting the allowance of net operating
loss carryovers from year to year. The annual accounting concept,
inherent in the federal tax structure,11 requires the taxpayer to mea-
sure his income within a strictly defined period. Although this arbi-
trary accounting period has been accepted fairly readily by the
.American taxpayer, its use may lead to a distorted showing of real
earning ability, particularly in the case of a taxpayer with a widely
fluctuating income.1' Congress, in attempting to ameliorate these
problems, has inserted provisions in the various revenue acts allowing
businessmen to apply annual net operating losses to profitable prior
and subsequent accounting periods.15 These loss carryover provisions,
7. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 122, 53 Stat. 867 (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 172).
8. British Motor Car Distributors, Ltd., 31 T.C. 437 (1958).
9. 27 T.C. 879 (1957).
10. 11 T.C. 240 (1948).
11. British Motor Car Distributors, Ltd., 31 T.C. 437, 440-41 (1958).
12. Commissioner v. British Motor Car Distributors, Ltd., 278 F.2d 392, 395
(9th Cir. 1960).
13. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 441(a); see Surrey & Warren, Cases on Federal
Income Taxation 501 (1960 ed.).
14. See generally Hahn, Methods of Accounting: Their Role in the Federal
Income Tax Law, 1960 Wash. U.L.Q. 1, 12-14; Harrow, Income Averaging by
Loss Carry-over and Carry-back, N.Y.U. 13th Inst. on Fed. Tax 771 (1955).
15. The net operating loss carryover privilege was originally granted by the
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 204, 40 Stat. 1060. Subsequent acts made minor
changes. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 204, 42 Stat. 231; Revenue Act of 1924,
ch. 234, § 206, 43 Stat. 260; Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 206, 44 Stat. 17;
Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, §§ 23(i), 117(b), 45 Stat. 800, 825; Revenue Act
of 1932, ch. 209, §§ 23 (i), 117, 47 Stat. 180, 207. The privilege was rescinded in
1933. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 218(a), 48 Stat. 209 (1933).
It was regranted by the Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 247, § 211, 53 Stat. 867, as
amended by Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 15(e), 56 Stat. 807; Revenue Act of
1950, ch. 994, §§ 15(g) (2), 215, 64 Stat. 919, 937-38; Revenue Act of 1951, cl.
521, § 330, 65 Stat. 505; Technical Changes Act of 1953, ch. 512, § 205, 67 Stat.
619; Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 172, 68A Stat. 63; Technical Amendments
Act of 1958, §§ 14, 1377 (b), 203, 72 Stat. 1611, 1656, 1678.
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while serving a useful and desirable end in the context for which they
were designed, have created serious and unforeseen tax avoidance
possibilities, by promoting a market for the sale of corporations with
loss carryover credits, in order to decrease the acquiring entity's
taxable income.'
Previous to the passage of section 129, courts developed several
very effective methods of striking down taxpayer avoidance schemes.
The tax diminishing effect of a transaction was voided if the transfer
or purchase had no valid "business purpose."," Courts also struck
down the tax benefit if they found that the transaction created a new
taxable entity.18 Although these judicial techniques were helpful,
traffic in loss corporations went on unabated. 1
In an attempt to remove tax avoidance opportunities available under
the loss carryover allowances, section 129 was added to the Code in
1944.20 However, in the stormy first decade of its existence, the
Commissioner was "singularly unsuccessful" in applying its provi-
sions.21
When the acquiring corporation did not have a tax credit, section
129 disallowed a benefit if the principal purpose of the transfer was
avoidance of taxes.22 Here the judicial approach of searching for a
"business purpose" was employed, and if such a purpose were found,
16. H.R. Rep. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1943).
17. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1934); Kocin v. United
States, 187 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1951); David's Specialty Shops, Inc. v. Johnson,
131 F.Supp. 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); ef. WAGE, Ire., 19 T.C. 249 (1952); Chelsea
Products, Inc., 16 T.C. 840 (1951). But cf. Northup v. United States, 240 F.2d
304 (2d Cir. 1957).
18. See, e.g., Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957); Higgins v.
Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Lewellyn, 248 U.S. 71 (1918);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918); Mill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patter-
son, 264 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 816 (1959); Continental
Oil Co. v. Jones, 113 F.2d 557 (10th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 687 (1940);
cf. Northway Sec. Co., 23 B.T.A. 532 (1931). See generally National Investors
Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944).
19. The following advertisement appeared in the New York Times business
section: "Excess Profits Tax Savings Opportunity For Sale: Stock of Corporation
having 1943 tax loss deduction of $120,000. Sole assets are $80,000 in cash and
equivalent." N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1943, § 5, p. 11, col. 8. See generally, Rudick,
Acquisitions to Avoid Income or Excess Profits Tax: Section 129 of the Internal
Revenue Code, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 197 (1944).
20. Added by ch. 63, 58 Stat. 47 (1944).
21. Magill & Kosmian, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Income, Deduc-
tions, Gains & Losses, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 201, 218 (1954).
22. See, e.g., Alpha Tank & Sheet Metal Mfg. Co. v. United States, 126 Ct.
Cl. 878, 116 F.Supp. 721 (1953). See Holzian, Who Wants a Tax Loss?, Monthly
Digest of Tax Articles 23 (Jan. 1953).
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the credit was granted. -  Judges seemed reluctant to rule that the
principal purpose of a business transaction was tax avoidance.2 4
However, if the shares of a corporation having a tax credit had
been acquired prior to the acquiring of another business by that cor-
poration, the courts did not recognize that this was also a type of
acquisition forbidden by the spirit of the statute. 5 Since the corpora-
tion already had the allowance, they reasoned, the section did not
apply. These cases might well have resulted in a ruling favorable to
the government, had the courts been willing to go beyond the corpor-
ate entity and face the reality that even if the corporation had not
acquired a credit, the new stockholders had, but this, they were
reluctant to do.2'
This reluctance may be explained in part by the distinctions drawn
in the older cases between the form of the transaction and its sub-
stance. One of the very early cases held that "if the device is carried
out by means of legal forms, it is subject to no legal censure. -2 T As
late as 1935, so eminent a jurist as Judge Learned Hand said "a
man's motive to avoid taxation will not establish his liability if the
transaction does not do so without it. ' '28 Thus courts were hesitant to
look behind the form of the device into the substance of the scheme
itself, and apparently, the corporate form was not scrutinized if there
was a scintilla of business purpose.
Before the British Motor Car decision, the most influential opinion
discussing section 129 was handed down by the Tax Court in the
23. See, e.g., WAGE, Inc., 19 T.C. 249 (1952). For a similar approach prior
to § 129 see W.P. Hobby, 2 T.C. 980 (1943).
24. See American Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 125 (9th Cir.
1957). Here the court found a business purpose on what appears to be extremely
tenuous evidence.
25. See Alprosa Watch Corp., 11 T.C. 240 (1948).
26. Id. at 245. For example, if S, the stockholder, controlled the A corporation,
a very profitable business, and purchased all the shares of a loss corporation B,
and merged A into B, the courts would allow B to offset the income from its new
operations (A's) against its old net operating losses on the theory that B was a
separate taxable person from S. A willingness to look at the transaction on the
shareholder level, however, would immediately show that S was the sole bene-
ficiary of the purchase (the old owners-those who had originally suffered the loss
-having sold their interests to him) and the real acquiring party gaining a bene-
fit he was not already entiled to. Since there does not seem to be any reason why
the parties involved in the Alprosa Watch transaction, infra, could not have
incorporated a new firm rather than buy a loss corporation, application of this
analysis to the Alprosa case would have resulted in a finding for the government.
But see American Coast Line v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1948) (an
early case recognizing this concept).
27. United States v. Isham, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 496 (1873).
28. Chisholm v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1935).
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case of the Alprosa Watch Corp.2 1 A partnership, Paul V. Eisner &
Co., purchased a quantity of Swiss-made watches in 1943 through its
overseas agent, and later learned that the purchase was in violation of
an exclusive marketing contract between the foreign manufacturer
and a rival domestic distributor." Due to the turbulent state of war-
time communications, the shipment could not be cancelled and the
watches were delivered in New York. Rather than become involved in
litigation over the matter, Eisner and its competitor agreed to market
the watches through some existing organization, not then in the watch
business, and share the profits. An advisor of the Eisner Co. suggested
that the partners' wives buy the stock of a dormant glove retailing
business and market the watches through it. The suggested transac-
tion was consummated and the name of the glove company was
changed to the Alprosa Watch Corp.31 The watches were sold, and
tax credits of the old company were applied to offset profits of the new
corporation.
In upholding taxpayer's claim to the credits, the court found that
the Alprosa Watch Corp. and its predecessor glove company were the
same jural person for tax purposes.32 Although section 129 did not
apply because the credits were claimed for a taxable year beginning
before the effective date of the statute, the court said in an oft-quoted
passage, "That section [129] would seem to prohibit the use of a
deduction, credit, or allowance only by the acquiring person or corpor-
ation and not their use by the corporation whose control was ac-
quired.,,3
Typical of the litigation in the years following Alprosa were the
A.B. & Container Co?p. 3 4 WAGE, Inc./3 and T.V.D. Co.3 6 cases. None
resulted in rulings for the government. In the T.V.D. Co. case,3 t the
Tax Court noted that "the petitioner here ... is an acquired corpora-
tion, and... section 129 has no application in this case." 38 The ration-
ale here seems to be that a taxpayer is entitled to his credits, and a
corporation is a separate taxpayer.
In Alprosa, the glove company was viewed as the acquiring corpora-
tion, even though it had been acquired by the wives of the partners
29. 11 T.C. 240 (1948).
30. Id. at 241.
31. Id. at 242.
32. Id. at 246.
33. Id. at 245. (Emphasis added.)
34. 14 T.C. 842 (1950).
35. 19 T.C. 249 (1952).
36. 27 T.C. 879 (1957),
37. Ibid.
38. Id. at 886.
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who owned the watches. In the British Motor Car Co.3 case, the
appliance company was the acquiring corporation in this sense, since
it too had been acquired by the partners in the auto company and
then, in turn, had acquired the assets of the automobile agency. '
The real difference between the holding in the two cases is one of
statutory interpretation.
One of the first government victories under the new reading of the
section was Coastal Oil Storage Co. v. Commissioner,1 decided in 1957.
Coastal Terminals Inc. operated a terminal facility for, oil storage at
North Charleston, S.C., and leased some of its property there to the
Quartermaster General. In 1951, Coastal Oil Storage Co. was organ-
ized as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Coastal Terminals, holding all of
the storage tanks used by the government.42 The Tax Court allowed
the $25,000 surtax exemptions and minimum excess profits credits
claimed by the new corporation on a finding that section 129 was in-
applicable.4 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the
taxpayer secured the "benefit of an exemption and -credit which it
would not otherwise have enjoyed,'1" and reversed that portion of the
Tax Court's decision dealing with section 129.
Although the case was a split-up rather than an acquisition, the
legal principle it established has been applied to various situations
where a tax benefit accrued to a shareholder. The courts have followed
this line of reasoning in Mill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patterson,45 Thomas E.
Snyder Sons Co.," and, of course, in the British Motor Car case,4 7 all
dealing with acquisitions of loss corporations.
Decisions like Alprosa read the words in section 129, "which such
person or corporation would not othervise enjoy," as modifying
"deduction." 4 ' Accordingly, if no deduction was acquired, the credit
was granted. But the Court of Appeals in Coastal Oil took a different
stand and read these words as modifying "benefit of a deduction" and
disallowed the credit since the use of the allowance was acquired."
39. British Motor Car Distributors, Ltd., 31 T.C. 437 (1958).
40. Id. at 438.
41. 242 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1957), affirming in part and reversing in part 25
T.C. 1304 (1956).
42. Coastal Oil Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1957).
43. Coastal Oil Storage Co., 25 T.C. 1304, 1312 (1956).
44. Coastal Oil Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 396, 398 (4th Cir. 1957).
(Emphasis added.)
45. 264 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1959).
46. 34 T.C. No. 39 (June 6, 1960).
47. Commissioner v. British Motor Car Distributors, Ltd., 278 F.2d 392 (9th
Cir. 1960).
48. T.V.D. Co., 27 T.C. 879, 886 (1957).
49. Commissioner v. British Motor Car Distributors, Ltd., 278 F.2d 392, 394-
95 (9th Cir. 1960).
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The result has been that the courts will now go beyond the corporate
facade and search the affairs of the shareholders.
This interpretation means that section 129 (a) may now be used to
prevent the acquisition of corporations which are attractive because of
certain tax characteristics (even though those corporations would use
the credits in their own tax returns) provided the acquisitions would
result in diminished liability for the acquiring shareholders.50
The older cases took the position that business dealings take place
on either of two levels. That is, corporations deal with each other and
shareholders deal with other shareholders. Although the first type of
transaction was examined, the courts felt that the latter was beyond
the-scope of section 129 when the taxpayer was a corporation. With
few exceptions,51 courts refused to recognize that a benefit accruing
to a corporation eventually is a benefit to the shareholders, and that
if a corporation claims a deduction, even one it already has, a newly-
acquiring stockholder is getting an allowance he did not have.
With the precedent of Coastal Oil, the windfall benefits supported
by the Alprosa interpretation can be disallowed. Courts will no longer
recognize a distinction between the corporate and stockholder levels
in loss carryover acquisition cases; the corporate fiction will be
ignored in a search for the ultimate beneficiary.
This interpretation moves the matter along to the real issue, the
application of the "principal purpose" test.5 2 That is, can the trier of
fact find a valid business purpose behind the transaction? This, of
course, is in line with the established judicial method of invalidating
taxpayer avoidance attempts.5  The British Motor Car case" did not
upset this doctrine. The new line of judicial reasoning, apparent in
these modern cases, merely means that now a business purpose on the
corporate level may need additional support, by a showing of business
purpose on the shareholder level also, if the credit is to be granted.'$
Many problems still remain unsolved. For example, if there is a
sufficient corporate business purpose, must the shareholder also show
a business purpose, or will this fact be enough to bar a penetration of
50. See, e.g., Commissioner v. British Motor Car Distributors, Ltd., 278 F.2d
392 (9th Cir. 1960); Mill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patterson, 264 F.2d 713 (5th Cir.
1959); Coastal Oil Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1957);
James Realty Co. v. United States, 176 F.Supp. 306 (D. Minn. 1959); Thomas E.
Snyder Sons Co., 34 T.C. No. 39 (June 6, 1960).
51. American Coast Line v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1948).
52. See Surrey & Warren, op. cit. supra note 13, at 1595.
53. See cases cited at footnote 17 supra.
54. Commissioner v. British Motor Car Distributors, Ltd., 278 F.2d 392 (9th
Cir. 1960).
55. Compare Thomas E. Snyder Sons Co., 34 T.C. No. 39 (June 6, 1960),
with Virginia Metal Products, Inc., -3 T.C. No. 88 (Jan. 29. 1960).
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the corporate entity? Must both the corporation and the shareholder
satisfy the court that a legitimate business purpose motivated their
actions, or will a business purpose on the shareholder level justify
the credit even if there is no valid corporate purpose?56
As one court has stated, "What kind of 'business purpose' must be
shown as necessary ... is not made clear.... ."" The reason and neces-
sity for the Alprosa transaction was apparent; the reasons for the
British Motor Car transfers cannot clearly be determined if one
destroys the tax benefits. The Alprosa acquisition probably would
have been made absent the tax advantages, for the tax benefits were
really only icing on the cake, making this particular corporation that
much more desirable. It seems unlikely, however, that British Motor
Car Distributors would have made any move had not the tax benefits
been present.5 8
The test then can probably be expressed by a simple rephrasing of
the standard tort question: what would the reasonably prudent tax-
payer have done under the circumstances? The trier of fact must
make the decision relying on an objective standard of conducthB
The difficulty with this type of test is immediately apparent. What
seems to be good business practice to one person may appear to be
reckless speculation to another. Business judgments invariably differ
and some companies prosper where others fail. What later turns out
to be the better choice leads to a profit; a poor decision becomes a
loss. But, unlike a mistake by the "unreasonable, imprudent" man,
business mistakes usually do not result in civil liability or a legal
censure equivalent to a branding of "negligent." Yet this rule could
conceivably subject a taxpayer to the ordeal of protracted litigation
with the Internal Revenue Service and its concomitants-possible loss
of reputation, decreased business activity, and large expenditures for
legal defense. Even good faith does not save such a corporate tax-
payer, for there was no showing, or even allegation of fraud in the
British Motor Car case; the petitioner simply made no attempt to show
that tax evasion was not a purpose of the acquisition.6*
Realizing that section 129 was inadequate as originally enforced
by the courts,6l Congress, in enacting section 382, specifically barred
56. These questions arise only when the corporations are controlled by an
identifiable interest. See the section dealing with constructive ownership. Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 318.
57. W.P. Hobby, 2 T.C. 980, 985 (1943).
58. British Motor Car Distributors, Ltd., 31 T.C. 437, 441 (1958).
59. Alcorn Wholesale Co., 16 T.C. 75, 89 (1951).
60. "[P]etitioner has made no attempt to prove ... that the stock acquisition
was not done for the purpose of tax evasion." British Motor Car Distributors,
Ltd., 31 T.C. 437, 441 (1958).
61. S. Rcp. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1954).
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the allowance of net operating loss carryovers, if there was a purchase
of a corporation and a change in its business activity, providing cer-
tain other technical requirements were present.6 2 Therefore, in these
areas at least, the question of business purpose has become a dead
issue. Yet, because section 382 sets out very specific standards, many
transactions will not fall within its prohibition.6 3
Only one significant case discussing section 129 has been passed on
by the Supreme Court. Libson Shops Inc. v. Koehler" involved the
amalgamation by merger of sixteen retail stores and a management
concern, all separately incorporated and all having the same stock-
holders, into what had been the management corporation.5 Three of
the retail outlets had net operating losses. In denying the management
firm the right to deduct these losses under the carryover provisions,
the court also denied the applicability of section 129, finding no pur-
pose of tax evasion. 6 The deduction was denied on the ground that
there was no "continuity of business enterprise. 8 7 Six years earlier,
the Tax Court had decided a case with analogous facts in favor of the
taxpayer on a finding of "business purpose." 8 Seemingly, the Libson
Shops case. would now preclude any such finding, since a "business
purpose" is implicit in a specific ruling that there was no evasion or
avoidance purpose in the reorganization.
If "business purpose" will not support the taxpayer's position, just
what type of continuity of enterprise is required? In a footnote to the
62. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 382 (a). Some writers feel that most if not all of
the old § 129 situations can now be cast so as to be covered by § 382(b) and the
allowance granted or denied under the terms of this section without recourse to
§ 269. Cohn, Acquiring the Loss Corporation: Fact or Fancy, N.Y.U. 13th Inst.
on Fed. Tax 757, 768 (1955). Because § 382 does not mention § 269, it seems to be
entirely independent of it. Thus if a taxpayer avoids the technical pitfalls of §
382, he must still clear the hurdle of § 269. An argument has been made that if
§§ 381 or 382 will allow the transaction, the Congressional intent was that § 269
should not limit its benefits. Rice, Internal Revenue Code, Section 269: Does the
Left Hand Know What the Right Is Doing?, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 579, 590-95
(1955). Because of the technical questions presented by § 382, this note will not
attempt to discuss that section in detail.
63. The Senate, recognizing this, said:
If a limitation in this section [382] applies to a net operating loss carry-
over, section 269, relating to acquisitions made to evade or avoid income
tax, shall not also be applied to such net operating loss carryover. How-
ever, the fact that a limitation under this section does not apply shall
have no effect upon whether section 269 applies. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 284 (1954).
64. 353 U.S. 382 (1957).
65. Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382, 383 (1957).
66. Id. at 389.
67. Id. at 386. Accord, Patten Fine Papers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 249 F.2d
776 (7th Cir. 1957).
68. Berland's Inc. of South Bend, '16 T.C. 182 (1951).
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Libson Shops decision, the court indicated its refusal to decide "situa-
tions like those presented in ... Alprosa Watch Corp. r. Commissioner
... A.B. & Container Corp. v. Commissioner... WAGE, Inc. v. Com-
missioner . . . [since] in these cases a single corporate taxpayer
changed the character of its business....,, In Libson Shops, however,
the only change was in the ownership of the stock. Although it had
once been owned by individuals, it was now owned by a single corpora-
tion with an enlarged capital structure, all of which was owned by
these same individuals.o In essence, this was the same kind of change
made in the Alprosa and A.B. & Container Co.71 cases, so that the
issue was at least decided by implication, unless when a single cor-
poration is involved, a "business purpose" is sufficient to justify the
allowance.
But then the question is why should single and multiple corpora-
tions be governed by different rules? Possibly the court felt justified
in treating them differently because of the specific excess profits tax
exemption originally granted to each corporation.12 But the splitting
of a large corporation into several smaller subsidiary corporations had
been deemed cause to deny the basic exemption.7 3
Another possibility is that if the losing business activity is carried
on for any length of time, the Supreme Court will allow the tax
credit."4 But if this is what the Libson Shops case meant, it is a
strange holding indeed, bad for business and government both. In
effect, such a ruling would force a taxpayer to continue in a losing
operation, simultaneously depleting both his own resources and
governmental revenue.
The Libson Shops case has failed to establish any useful rule for
deciding cases involving loss corporations.7 5 This might be explained
in part by the complexity of the transactions involved and the basic
difficulty in getting to the real heart of the situation. Nevertheless,
complex or not, some standard must eventually be established against
69. Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382, 390 (1957).
70. Id. at 383.
71. 14 T.C. 842 (1950).
72. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 710(b) (1), 54 Stat. 975 (1940).
73. Coastal Oil Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1957);
see Cohen, Exemptions and Credits of Multiple Corporations: Sections 15(c) and
129, U. So. Cal. 1953 Tax Inst. 1, 10. But cf. National Carbide Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
74. A.B. & Container Corp., 14 T.C. 842 (1950).
75. The Internal Revenue Service announced that it would not rely on the
Libson Shops decision in any cases involving a merger or any transaction des-
cribed in § 381 (a) of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954. Rev. Rul. 58-603, 1958-2 Cure.
Bull. 147. See generally Levine & Petta, Libson Shops Applied to the Single
Corporate Taxpayer, 36 Taxes 562 (1958); Levine & Petta, Libson Shops: A
Study in Semantics, 36 Taxes 445 (1958).
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which businessmen may test their alternative moves with some degree
of certainty as to the outcome.
It is difficult to formulate any really workable test which fully
eliminates the objections."6 Any subjective test would undoubtedly
lead to inequitable enforcement against some taxpayers; continuation
of the objective test in the absence of any hard and fast standards of
conduct would leave the businessman always on the edge of uncer-
tainty and place the final decision in each case on judicial determina-
tion of the particular, peculiar facts of each case.
Even the presumption written into the 1954 Code, although speci-
fically designed to solve these problems, has not been able to satisfy
the writers. This section, 269(c), provides that any purchase price
disproportionate to the sum of the adjusted basis of the property and
the tax benefits not reflected therein is prima facie evidence of a prin-
cipal purpose of tax avoidance." This places the burden of proof
squarely on the claimant.78 In effect, it warns all prospective buyers of
a loss corporation that they had better be able to produce evidence
satisfactorily supporting a claim of business purpose, or lose all tax
benefits at the very outset. Still, the standard is not clearly defined,
but the presumption requires that any attempted showing of a busi-
ness purpose must at least outweigh any tax benefits incidental to
that purpose.
More certainty would be desirable.79 The interest of the Internal
Revenue Service is really twofold. As Congress has explained it, it is
"to insure that the small minority who have indulged in these schemes
take nothing by their artifice, and to protect the overwhelming major-
ity of taxpayers who have refused to participate in such transac-
tions."'so Thus, the real aim is to eliminate only unjustified tax cred-
its.81
76. Many solutions have been proposed. For example, one authority suggests
that loss carryovers be limited to 50% of the consideration paid for the company.
Surrey, Income Tax Problems of Corporations and Shareholders: American Law
Institute Tax Project-American Bar Association Committee Study on Legisla-
tive Revision, 14 Tax L. Rev. 1, 34 (1958). Presently proposed regulations would
establish very narrow limits in which mergers or sales of companies would be
allowed. Metz, Tax-Loss Merger Becoming Harder, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1961, §
3, p. 1, col. 1.
77. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 269(c).
78. Ibid.
79. Surrey & Warren, Cases on Federal Income Taxation 37 (1960 ed.).
80. H.R. Rep. No. 1079, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1944).
81. "The key to the solution of problems involving avoidance should be the
policy rather than the mere letter of the law. The policy bf the law clearly
countenances certain types of avoidance . .-. . " Rudick, Acquisitions to Avoid
Income or Excess Profits Tax: Section 129 of the Internal Revenue Code, 58
Hiarv. L. Rev. 197, 223 (1944). See I.T. 3757, 1945 Cum. Bull. 200 (Companies
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NOTES
The British Motor Car case removed one of the major obstacles to
the formulation of a really workable test12 and it may now be possible
to use section 269 in order to protect the federal revenue and the
innocent taxpayer simultaneously. It might be desirable to amend the
statute so that the presumption would be applied only to the real bene-
ficiary of the deduction, after examination has shown that he would
be getting an allowance to which he was not already entitled, if the
credit were granted. Constructive ownership rules could be made
applicable, as in present sections, so that joint beneficiaries would
also be subject to the test. Although this does not entirely eliminate
the possibility of business purpose problems, since business purpose
would still be a prerequisite to recognition of the credits, it does assure
that they will be presented only when absolutely justified; that is,
only when there has been a previous showing that tax avoidance may
have been one of the major reasons for the transaction.
quailifying as Western Hemisphere trade corporations under § 109 will not be
subject to § 129 even if the principal purpose of their formation was to gain the
deductions granted in § 15(b)).
82. See pp. 79-80 supra.
83. See, e.g., Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 382(a) (3).
84. For a discussion of the loss carryover provisions and their effects on
governmental revenue and business, see Sears, Minimizing Taxes 102-04 (1922);
Simons, Federal Tax Reform 56, 139-40 (1950) ; Twentieth Century Fund, Facing
the Tax Problem 282-83, 302-03, 393-94, 399 (1937).
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